Introduction
This paper aims to explore what, on the face of it, ought to be an important and interesting topic in the international theory of Hedley Bull -the role, influence and significance of the Just War tradition. The reasons for this potential interest are several.
Firstly, Bull, of course, identifies war as one of the five institutions of an international society and the interaction between this institution and another -international law -has been shaped by the Just War tradition in many ways.
1 Secondly, Bull was interested in and wrote about Grotius, a major figure in the development of Just War thinking, especially, but not solely, in relation to international law. 2 Thirdly, normative and ethical debate are often seen as central to the English school and it is difficult to escape the influence of Just War when we turn our minds in this direction in relation to war. Bull certainly saw war as '… an inherently normative phenomenon; it is unimaginable apart from rules by which human beings recognize what behavior is appropriate to it and define their attitudes toward it.' 3 Fourthly, limitations on the use of violence are seen by Bull as one of the defining characteristics, alongside rules about property and the status fundamental tension between the empirical and the ethical in Hedley Bull's work that can also be seen in, for example, his conceptualisation of order.
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The paper proceeds in three main stages, the first looking at Bull's arguments about war as an institution of international society and the connections between this and his understanding of Grotius. This might lead one to expect Bull would follow this through to look at Grotius as a Just War theorist or, at least, at Grotius's influence on Just War theory. However, this move is not made and the second main section attempts to explain this, principally by considering Bull as a moral sceptic, or at least as a sceptic when it comes to Natural Law as a basis for ethical claims and how he locates Just War in relation to Natural Law. Thirdly, the paper looks at whether Bull can be read as some sort of Just War theorist, at least when it comes to jus ad bellum restrictions on the resort to war, via his claims about war as an institution of an international society predicated on the maintenance of order amongst states. Finally, the conclusion will expand on the claim that Bull's engagement, or lack of it, with the Just War tradition reinforces the idea of him as wrestling with a fundamental indecisiveness when it comes to embracing the ethical and normative significance of his theory.
War as an institution of international society
Much has been written about the idea of what constitutes an 'institution' of international society, and there remains a good deal to be resolved in terms of rendering the concept precise within English school theory. 8 There are various lists of institutions, but Bull's has the virtue, at least, of brevity -listing only five: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the special responsibilities of the great powers. 9 This paper does not plan to contribute to the debate over what constitutes an institution of international society or to assess whether Bull's list is the 'right' one, in comparison with those drawn up by others. Instead, this section will look at how Bull saw the institution of war as operating and how he connected this to a wider notion of a Grotian tradition or conception of international society. This will hopefully elucidate to some extent what Bull meant by the idea of an institution, and the idea of war as such an institution in particular, but the emphasis is on how this account might expect us to see Bull engaging
with Just War theory.
Bull famously defined an institution as '… not necessarily … an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals.' 10 Given this definition it is easy to understand the 
Scepticism and distrust -Bull on Just War
The principal reason for Bull's scepticism about Just War lies in his emphasis on its indebtedness to Natural Law and his distrust of this approach to political theory. This, indeed, is a consistent theme of Bull's work throughout his writing and whilst his hostility to Natural Law is somewhat tempered in his late work, it is still present. Thus whilst There are no moral arguments to be propounded nor moral criteria to be identified that are beyond dispute: for those we employ we create and do not discover. The moral doctrines which unite particular societies or social movements are different and often incompatible; they reflect the existence of different ways of life, and of conflicts among them. … In facing the question of the morality of war, then, we should recognize that the only moral criteria we are able to employ are parochial ones; 
Bull as a Just War theorist?
As noted at the start of this paper, casting Hedley Bull as a Just War theorist is a rather tall order. Certainly I do not intend to try to make a claim that he can be seen as major contributor to the tradition of Just War theory. Instead, the purpose of this section is not to pretend that a sheep is really a goat, but instead to suggest that Bull does have a This paper is not the place to engage in a detailed assessment of Bull's methodology.
The relationship between Bull's approach and social constructivism, for example, has been discussed elsewhere. 60 The similarities are more than skin deep, enabling the development of social constructivism to be used to good effect in refining the methodological underpinnings of English school theory. 61 What is important to this argument is that the recognition of the norm-bound and ethically significant character of sign that Bull was aware of Mavrodes' argument, but he would, it seems likely, have been bound to reject it in any case. This is despite his observation on jus in bello rules that '… the duty to abide by the rules of war must be made reciprocal, for it is only on the understanding of reciprocity that any prospect exists of their being observed.' 68 As Bull argues in his review of Walzer, 'The distinction between moral rules and rules that are better described as procedural or customary is not always easy to draw. War has its own ethic, its own distinguished apologists and its own place in the honour and esteem of many human societies of which our present fears and interests cannot rob it. But it appears to me, here, now, something evil, in which any kind of acquiescence is in some measure morally degrading. Organized violence itself, and the habits and attitudes associated with threatening it and preparing for it, are ugly and alien. Seeing pluralism and solidarism as more a spectrum than a bifurcation, and recognising the potential for pluralist and solidarist international societies, as Bull does, but also pluralist and solidarist world societies, as Bull does not, demands that we weaken Bull's insistence on foundational claims for ethical schemas. But that does not have to result in relativism or ethics as 'mere opinion'. Some opinions are worth more than others, some arguments are better than others and some claims do have more appeal and are more insightful and telling than others. There are common ethical questions that all societies ask, as Bull famously argues himself in relation to order, and there is frequent overlap in the nature of the most durable and telling answers. 82 Bull, it seems, wants a version of ethics that is like a yard-stick, which can be held up against any set of circumstances to enable definitive answers to be given about the ethicality or otherwise of the situation, the action or the actor. This is what he wants Just War to do but feels it cannot because of a combination of his scepticism about the existence of any such standards in the first place and their certain inadmissibility in international society as it has existed since the seventeenth century at least.
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But the Just War tradition has never really been the kind of ethical theory that Bull sees it as being, as his account of Grotius should have caused him to understand. Neither,
arguably, has such a straightforward 'yardstick' approach to ethics held sway within Just
War. Walzer's approach is problematic, and Bull identifies some reasons for this, and the current, almost aggressive, insistence on human rights as the basis for a modernised foundational claim for Just War, to be found in some quarters, is also far from immune from criticism. 84 Yet these approaches are not at one another's throats as might be expected if Bull's methodological claims about ethics were widely shared and accepted.
Dealing with mixed sources, accepting and exploring the ambiguity and also the problems and challenges that arise from such sources was, according to Bull, one of the 
